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A COMMENTARY ON THE ICANN
"BLUEPRINT" FOR EVOLUTION AND
REFORM
David R. Johnson, * David Post, * * and Susan P. Crawford***
I. SUMMARY
Contracts between the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) and domain name registries and registrars
give ICANN the right to impose domain name policies on those
registries and registrars (and thereby on the wider user community),
but only where those policies have been the subject of documented
consensus.' The "consensus policy" theory is central to ICANN's
legitimacy and was the product of intense negotiation at the time of
ICANN's founding.2 In October 2002, in Shanghai, China, the
ICANN Board approved new bylaws that allow the Board to adopt
domain name policies by a vote of the Board, irrespective of the
presence or absence of consensus among any of the various
stakeholders. These new bylaws represent an intentional departure
from the consensus decision-making model, and a move towards
centralized, top-down policy-making.
We believe that abandoning consensus as the basis for ICANN
policy-making is neither in ICANN's best interests nor in the best
interests of the Internet community. It will substantially undermine
ICANN's authority, as it eliminates the only answer that now exists
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1. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, pt. II.D.l.b.i (Nov. 9, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htrn.
2. See ICANN Background (Nov. 4, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/
general/background.htm#7.
3. See Preliminary Report: ICANN Meeting in Shanghai (Oct. 31, 2002),
at http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-3 I oct02.htm.
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to the question that more and more people will ask: "What gives
ICANN the right to tell anyone what to do?"
II. BACKGROUND
In late September 1999, a web of contracts was announced
between and among Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), the year-old
ICANN, and the U.S. Department of Commerce.4 NSI was, at the
time, the sole registry and the sole registrar for the ".com," ".net,"
and ".org" top-level domains (TLDs). 5 ICANN and the Department
of Commerce made it clear that NSI's monopoly on registrar
functions was going to end; ICANN was proceeding with its plan to
open up the registrar function to competitors who would have the
ability to sell second-level domains (like "ibm.com") in these TLDs
and to register those second-level domains on their customers' behalf
in the central registry. 6 In the contract, ICANN and the Department
of Commerce agreed to allow NSI to continue to operate the top-
level registries in these domains, and to charge registrars a fee of up
to six dollars per name for the registration of second-level domains
within those registries.
7
NSI, in turn, agreed to submit to ICANN's authority over its
8activities. More specifically, NSI agreed to comply with ICANN's
then-current domain name policies, as well as with ICANN's future
policies relating to "issues for which uniform or coordinated
resolution is reasonably necessary to facilitate interoperability,
technical reliability and/or stable operation of the Internet or
4. See Approved Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc. (Nov. 10, 1999), at http://www.icann.
org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm; Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 1.
5. See ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION: HISTORY OF THE SRS
[hereinafter ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION], at http://www.icann.org/
registrars/accreditation-history.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
6. See id.; Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (June 10, 1998) (statement of policy).
7. See ICANN, REGISTRAR ACCREDITATION, supra note 5; see also NSI-
Registrar License Agreement § 5.2(b) (Nov. 9, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/
nsi/nsi-rla-04nov99.htm.
8. See Amendment 19 to Cooperative Agreement Between NSI and U.S.
Government (Nov. 8, 1999), at http://www.icann.org/nsi/coopagmt-amendl9-
04nov99.htm (stating, "[a]mendment 19 solidifies those arrangements and
provides that in operating the registry NSI will abide by consensus policies
adopted in the ICANN process.").
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domain-name system." 9  There was, however, a proviso: only
policies that were the result of consensus, as documented by a
written report showing (a) the extent of agreement among affected
groups, (b) the outreach process used to obtain the views of groups
likely to be affected, and (c) the nature and intensity of reasoned
support and opposition to the proposed policy-and that were
recommended by at least a two-thirds vote of the council of the
ICANN Supporting Organization addressing the issue-would be
binding on NSI in the future. 10 In addition, the contract provided that
in the event of a disagreement about the existence vel non of a
consensus on any such future policy, the issue would be reviewed by
an Independent Review Panel (IRP) to be established under
ICANN's bylaws. "
These provisions became standard in ICANN's contracts with
all of the gTLD (non-country code) registrars and registries.'2 The
basic notion behind the consensus policy regime is that registry and
registrar businesses have agreed to comply with future policies that
do not exist at the time they sign their contracts, mandating or
prohibiting particular actions by these businesses. But parties must
only comply with policies that are actually the product of a
documented outreach process and enjoy documented support by
9. ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement, Agreements pt. 3(A)(ii)(b) (Nov. 10,
1999), at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-registry-agreement-04nov99.htm.
10. See id. at Definitions pt. 1. During the first four years of ICANN's
existence, ICANN's Supporting Organizations were each focused on different
parts of ICANN's mandate: addressing through the Address Supporting
Organization; assigning domain names through the Domain Name Supporting
Organization; and assigning protocols through the Protocol Support
Organization. Almost all of the energy and controversy in the ICANN context
during these four years took place in the Domain Name Supporting
Organization. Within the Domain Name Supporting Organization, there were
still more groups-various constituencies established in ICANN's bylaws
(registries for generic names (gTLDs), registrars, intellectual property groups,
business, registries for country code names (ccTLDs), and a Names Council
made up of delegates from these constituencies.) The Names Council's job
was to facilitate and encourage the work of documenting "consensus" among
affected constituencies or parties concerning new mandatory policies.
11. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 1, pt. I.B.2. For
complicated reasons, the IRP has never been formed.
12. See id. pt. I.B.1-3 (paralleling the provisions of the ICANN-NSI
Registry Agreement).
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parties that are substantially affected by the policy.' 3 In the absence
of a consensus policy to the contrary, a registry or registrar is free to
innovate and run its business as it sees fit.
The premise of the consensus policy regime should have been
easy to understand: if most of those affected by a rule agree that it
will improve things, and intense opposition is absent, irrational,
limited to those who do not bear the costs of the policy in question,
or limited to those whose objection is based solely on a desire to
continue to engage in unjustifiable wrongdoing, then those who have
to implement the rule agree, by contract, to do so. This consensus
regime was designed to produce very few global rules for the naming
system. The idea was that everything not subject to a global
consensus policy would be subject to "local" control-control by the
registry itself, which would be subject to local law enforcement.
Only those policies that most affected parties agreed were needed to
assure interoperability and stability of the Domain Name System
(DNS) would be implemented in a global fashion.
Even before the 1999 web of contracts was implemented, the
ICANN community had an example of how the consensus policy
process could work. The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP), for which implementation documents were adopted in late
October 1999, is the closest thing that ICANN has to a consensus
policy.14 The report that accompanied the proposed UDRP reflected
an extensive series of discussions among those affected by the
proposal, documented arguments for and against the proposal, and
provided related background information.' The decision of the
Board to adopt the UDRP was based on the fact that intense
discussions among strong proponents of differing viewpoints had
yielded a document that was not vigorously opposed by any
substantially affected party.16 It is true that both substantive and
13. See id. pt. I.B. 1.
14. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 1, part I.B.5.
15. See Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 25, 1999), at www.icann.org/
udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct1999.htm; Draft Policy Prepared by
ICANN Staff and Counsel and Posted for Public Review and Comment (Sept.
29, 1999), at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-29Sept1999.htm.
16. See Minutes of Special Meeting, (Oct. 24, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-24oct99.htm.
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procedural mistakes were made with respect to the resulting policy.'
7
But the UDRP was not adopted until there was a widely shared view
that going forward with the proposal was better than not having any
standardized policy on the issue.'
8
Since 1999, however, no consensus policies have been created
or adopted by ICANN. There are several reasons for this
phenomenon. First, ICANN staff, who played a crucial role in
facilitating the deal-making and consensus-building that led to the
adoption of the UDRP, have not publicly exerted leadership in
calling for the creation of consensus policies and running the
process. ICANN staff and management have had deep concerns
about the consensus process from the beginning, because they worry
that holdouts will make the development of consensus impossible.'
9
They also worry that ICANN's credibility and ability to make both
global and effective rules will be undermined by this process, which
involves documentation of outreach and other time-consuming
efforts.20
Second, the development and structure of the constituency
system within the Domain Name Supporting Organization and the
work of the Names Council block any work towards true community
consensus along the lines followed by those who worked on the
UDRP. Each constituency views itself as a group of
"representatives" who work to further the perceived goals of their
constituents. At the same time, the Names Council, which was
supposed to facilitate the development of consensus, views itself as a
legislature. This "legislature" view has had the effect of filtering and
distorting events, producing a flurry of seat-claiming and report-
controlling but very little substantive work. The consensus report
17. See Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of
Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP (Aug. 2001), at
http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/frameset.html (criticizing UDRP); see also
Internet Democracy Project, Answers from Andy Mueller-Maguhn to IDP
Questionnaire at http://www.intemetdemocracyproj ect.org/IDPanswers
mueller.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
18. See Geist, supra note 17.
19. See Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, Working Paper on
the Policy-Development Process, pt. .A (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Working
Paper on the Policy-Development Process], at http://www.icann.org/
committees/evol-reform/working-paper-process-07mayO2.htm.
20. See id. pt. I.B.
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structure set forth in the registry/registrar contracts, with its
requirements of analysis and outreach, should have encouraged staff
and working groups to see themselves as the community's staff
rather than as a group of self-appointed representatives.
Unfortunately, that has not happened.
In February 2002, M. Stuart Lynn, ICANN's President,
announced that ICANN was broken and would have to be fixed
before it could continue its coordination work.21 Lynn proposed to
reform ICANN by increasing the staff by fifty percent (going from
twenty to thirty) and substantially increasing ICANN's budget.22 He
also wanted to change ICANN's organizational structure by revising
its Supporting Organizations and reducing the number of Board
members-and by dropping the effort to elect at-large Board
members from the Internet community.23 Instead, he proposed to
add five representatives from governments to represent the public
interest.24 Finally, he proposed that the ICANN Board should be
able to create global rules on its own that would mandate particular
actions by existing registries and registrars under contract with
ICANN-and thus, to eliminate the consensus requirement. 25 This
Article focuses on this last proposal.
ICANN's Board formed an Evolution and Reform Committee
(ERC) that published several drafts of a "Blueprint" for the new
ICANN during the summer of 2002.26 This work formed the basis of
the new bylaws that were adopted in October 2002 in Shanghai by
the ICANN Board.27 As of the date of this Article, ICANN has not
announced how it intends to deal with the existing registry and
registrar contracts. Currently, these contracts require documented
consensus as a condition for imposing a mandatory policy on registry
21. See M. STUART LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR
REFORM (Feb. 24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-
proposal-24feb02-htm.
22. See id. (proposing-in part three under the heading "Why the Current
Course Won't Work"-a budget increase of 300-500% to fully fund ICANN).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. Although how that could be done without amending the registry
and registrar contracts was not discussed.
26. See Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, ICANN: A Blueprint
for Reform (June 20, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform], at
http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20junO2.htm.
27. Preliminary Report ICANN Meeting in Shanghai, supra note 3.
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and registrar businesses.28 What will happen when ICANN tries to
impose on a registry a new policy that has not been the subject of
documented consensus?
III. WHY CARE ABOUT CONSENSUS?
Although the consensus policy regime has been in place within
ICANN for four years, many people who follow ICANN issues do
not understand, and are impatient with, the idea of consensus. 29 But
consensus provides a concrete answer to the question "Who gave
ICANN the right to tell me what to do?" In a sense, the consensus
policy theory provides a real "social contract" and contractually
binding "consent of the governed." The ICANN consensus theory
asks each potential participant whether they will agree contractually
to implement and abide by a future rule, sight unseen, provided that
most people support it and that those parties substantially affected by
the policy either do not vigorously oppose it, or their objection is
unreasonable.
This contract supports ICANN's legitimacy, and helps in
understanding ICANN, because it provides a demonstration that each
participant in the ICANN regime has affirmatively agreed to
ICANN's jurisdiction. However, ICANN's jurisdiction is limited to
the purpose of making global rules with which most affected
participants agree to go along. It is intentionally designed to produce
only those rules that most people agree should be global-and very
few rules will fall into this category. Everything that is not the
subject of a global consensus agreement will be left to local decision-
making. The consensus policy theory provides subjective balancing
between necessary global rules and local rules that no amount of
expertise can pretend to provide.
Rather than eliminate the requirement that mandatory policies be
supported by documented consensus, ICANN should more
effectively implement the consensus theory through increased Board
and staff participation in the consensus development process. The
consensus process cannot work without strong leadership. And, if
consensus of most of those substantially affected by a particular rule
28. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 1, pt. I.
29. See Working Paper on the Policy-Development Process, supra note 19,
pt. I.B. 1.
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does not exist, the default setting should be local policies-rather
than a top-down Board vote to create a new global policy. Because
ICANN can never be a global democracy and has no delegated rule-
making authority from the U.S. government, or any other
government, it needs another basis for legitimacy.
We have structured this Article as a commentary on the text of
the Blueprint that was published by the Board's ERC during the
summer of 2002. We suggest a different route than the one that was
ultimately adopted by the Board in Shanghai. We think the Board
should have upheld the key role of consensus as a limitation on its
authority to promulgate mandatory policies.
IV. ERC BLUEPRINT AND COMMENTARY
A. Policy Responsibility of the ICANN Board
The Board of Directors is ICANN's ultimate decision-making
body. It and it alone has the legal responsibility to make and be
legally accountable for all policy and other decisions. It is ultimately
responsible for the management of the policy development process.
Therefore, while it is highly desirable to seek and wherever possible
find consensus, it does not follow that even proposals that enjoy
consensus support should receive uncritical Board approval. The
Board has a fiduciary responsibility to make decisions on the basis of
good faith judgment in furthering the public interest.
30
In this regard, the ERC is stating that the Board can and should,
acting alone, have the ability to make all "policy and other"
decisions. 31 The ERC has presented its concern as: Right now,
every decision the Board makes has to be supported by consensus.
This is an untenable situation. We cannot be effective in this
context. We need reform to make these decisions on our own
without waiting for consensus.
32
We think it is important to understand that the Board makes
several different kinds of decisions. Only a small subset of these
decisions-those dealing with mandatory policies that flow down
through registry and registrar contracts-need to be supported by
30. See ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 26, § 4.
31. See id.
32. See Working Paper on the Policy-Development Process, supra note 19.
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documented consensus. Documented consensus is required only
when the rule adopted mandates or prohibits particular actions by
registries and registrars with whom ICANN has contracts
incorporating the consensus policy process.
There are, in general, four types of Board policy decisions: (1)
administrative, (2) amendments to existing contracts (or approvals
under existing contracts), (3) emergency, and (4) mandatory policies
that are binding on registries or registrars.
33
1. The Board can act administratively without consensus
When the Board needs to hire staff, allocate tasks, create a
committee of experts, or rent new space, it can do so without
anyone's consensus.
34
2. The Board can amend its contracts with registries, registrars, and
others (or approve actions under these contracts) without consensus
When, for one reason or another, provisions of contracts that
ICANN has entered into are amended by the mutual agreement of
ICANN and the other contracting party, only the Board can authorize
such amendments on behalf of ICANN. Similarly, approvals called
for in ICANN's contracts must be endorsed by the Board applying
criteria implicit in the intent underlying those contracts. In a sense,
the Board is the only voice ICANN has. The Board can authorize
amendments to these contracts, amendments that are voluntary on
both sides, or give approvals within parameters and for purposes set
forth in the contracts, without consensus. Of course, the Board can
ask anyone it likes for advice on the subject of contractual
amendments and approvals.
3. The Board can act in an emergency without consensus
Importantly, the Board can always adopt a temporary
specification or policy mandating (or prohibiting) particular action
by registries or registrars in an emergency. This is found in the
power to act when "the Board reasonably determines that immediate
temporary establishment of a specification or policy on the subject is
necessary to maintain the operational stability of Registrar Services,
33. See ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 26, § 4.
34. See id.
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the DNS, or the Internet." 35  Even in the absence of documented
consensus, such temporary policies can be treated as consensus
policies for up to a year while the real consensus process runs its
course.
4. But the Board cannot, in the absence of an emergency, adopt a
mandatory policy that is binding on a registry or registrar without
documented consensus
Under the current contracts ICANN has signed, when ICANN
seeks to impose a policy on a registry or registrar with which it
already has a contract, such policies must be the result of
consensus.
36
There is a very specific process set forth in those contracts: a
consensus must be demonstrated by a written report documenting (a)
the extent of agreement among impacted groups, (b) the outreach
process used to obtain the views of groups likely to be affected, and
(c) the nature and intensity of reasoned support and opposition to the
proposed policy-and must be recommended by at least a two-thirds
vote of the council of the ICANN Supporting Organization
addressing the issue.
37
When ICANN adopts policies that registries (or registrars) must
follow, those policies are only binding when a documented
consensus exists and when an IRP is available to review the Board's
determination that this is so. 38 When the Board makes decisions
about how many staff to pay for, or how many TLDs to open up, or
how to make decisions required directly by its contracts, it can
simply do that without documented consensus. 39 Additionally, the
Board is directly entitled to adopt some binding policies in
emergency circumstances when the stability of the DNS is
threatened. 40  But ICANN's contracts with gTLDs and sponsored
top-level domains (sTLD) registries, and with its accredited
registrars, currently obligate the contracting parties to follow future
35. Registrar Accreditation Agreement § 4.3.4 (May 17, 2001), at
http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement- 17may01 .htm.
36. See id. § 4.1.1.
37. See id.§ 4.3.1.
38. See id. §§ 4.3.2, 4.3.6.
39. See id. §§ 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.3.4, 4.4 (limiting the circumstances under
which registrars must comply).
40. See id. § 4.3.4.
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policies only when they are supported by both appropriate votes and
by documentation that demonstrates the existence of consensus
among affected parties.
4 1
We believe that the most effective ICANN reform would have
been based on and implemented through the existing contracts that
registries and registrars have signed. The Board should continue to
make future policies binding in accordance with the consensus
process as outlined in those documents. A claimed need for
consensus should not be allowed to hold up Board action on matters
that do not require the imposition of mandatory future policies on
contracting parties.
The Blueprint uses the word "policy" in two very different
ways, and the usage of this word should be clarified to avoid
confusion. While the Board is ultimately responsible for all policy
decisions, its ability to enforce policies that mandate particular
actions (or prohibit particular actions) by registries and registrars is
dependent on the terms of the contracts that ICANN has entered.
Accordingly, ICANN's Board should distinguish between those
decisions that are either administrative or that merely set policy
regarding future ICANN actions and those that create an obligation
on the part of contracting parties to follow such policies.
In determining whether a consensus exists, the Board is not
required to find that there are no opposing voices. Dissent may be
overridden when it is irrational or comes from parties not
substantially affected by a proposed policy. Dissent may also be
overridden if it comes from those whose objection stems from a
desire to continue activities that are "wrongful" because they
interfere with orderly markets or unjustifiably impose harm on third
parties.
ICANN's consensus process is broken because, among other
things, stakeholders lack adequate incentives to come to the policy
development table prepared to make a deal. It is clear that an
important implementation step should have been the establishment of
clearer guidelines for the Board's management of the consensus
development process (including deadlines and clear allocation of
41. See id. §§ 4.1, 4.1.1 (stating that "[d]uring the Term of this Agreement,
Registrar shall comply with the terms of this Agreement on the schedule set
forth in Subsection 4.4, with... new or revised specifications... and policies
established by ICANN as Consensus Policies ....").
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responsibility), exercise of its role in determining the existence of
consensus, and clear recognition of the Board's ability to take actions
that do not require consensus because they do not impose mandatory
rules on contracting parties. The Board should not have acted to free
itself completely from the strictures of the consensus policy concept.
B. Policy and Consensus Defined
"Policy" is a term that does not apply to every action that
ICANN takes, through its Board or otherwise. To qualify
as a policy decision, a matter brought before the Board for
Board action should exhibit some or all of the following
characteristics:
" It should be broadly applicable to multiple situations or
organizations (that is, not apply to just a single one-off
situation);
* It should be expected to have lasting value or
applicability, albeit with occasional updates;
* It should establish a guide or framework for future
decision-making.
42
We think that the ERC got it wrong with respect to what policy
means, and created a great deal of confusion with respect to this
issue. Policies may come in various forms. Some policies may
provide a framework for future decision-making but may not require
compliance by contracting registries and registrars. Some policies
may represent the kinds of "consensus policies" for which ICANN's
existing contracts explicitly require registries and registrars to
comply. Any proposed policy should be explicitly identified at the
outset as falling within one or another of these categories, as the
procedures and documentation differ for different kinds of policies.
Many, if not most, decisions made by the Board do not fit within
this meaning of a policy decision. They may, for example, be
decisions regarding a single one-off situation that has no foreseeable
future applicability, or they may be administrative decisions. To the
extent possible, however, other decisions made by ICANN should be
made within the framework of already developed policies. Certainly,
specific decisions may stimulate the need to develop broad policies.
43
42. ICANN: A Blueprint for Reform, supra note 26, § 4.
43. See id.
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As set forth above, many, if not most, of the Board's decisions
need not be based on a documented consensus. We agree that there
should be a clear mechanism for the Board or any constituency to
propose any kind of policy. This mechanism should be effective for
either consensus or another sort of policy.
Policy development through bottom-up consensus
processes should be encouraged. To be presumptively
binding, any policy developed must reflect a true
consensus, that is, a policy acceptable to the great majority
of those affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition.
Any such policy recommended to the ICANN Board, if not
acceptable to the Board, should be returned to the policy
development body with a clear statement of the Board's
concerns. If and when such a recommendation is returned
to the Board as a true consensus policy recommendation,
the Board may reject or modify such a recommendation
only by a 2/3 vote. In the absence of true consensus being
achievable, the Board will act according to its own best
judgment accounting for community principles, needs, and
desires as best it can interpret them.
44
There are several problems with this paragraph. First, "to be
presumptively binding," a consensus policy must come from below,
instead of being created by the Board. Second, the description of
reasons that would justify derailing a consensus policy should be
made clear and should not include "wrongful" action. Third, the
Board should not presume that it has the endorsement of the
worldwide public in applying its "own best judgment." No one
could presume to speak on behalf of the global Internet. We find
breathtaking the ERC's assertion that the Board could act to create
binding policies based solely on its own "judgment." We believe
this paragraph should have been revised to read:
Policy development through bottom-up consensus
processes should be encouraged. To be presumptively
binding, any policy developed must reflect a true
consensus, that is, a policy acceptable to the great majority
of those affected, with no strong and reasoned opposition
or with opposition only from those who seek to continue or
44. Id.
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commence activities that harm the competitive marketplace
or impose unjustifiable costs on third parties. Any such
policy recommended to the ICANN Board, if not
acceptable to the Board, should be returned to the policy
development body with a clear statement of the Board's
concerns. If and when such a recommendation is returned
to the Board as a true consensus policy recommendation,
the Board may reject ... edify-such a recommendation
only by a 2/3 vote. In the absence of true consensus as
defined above being achievable, the Board wi4 may act
aeaefdi. in exigent circumstances to its e;i bes +
judgmet a cu.t.ing fer community priniples, needs, and
desires as best it an interpret them preserve interoperabilitv
or the stable operation of the Internet.
4 5
The revised paragraph makes clear that the Board may modify
proposed binding consensus policies only if the modifications
themselves meet these consensus criteria (i.e., only when the Board
can document that objections to the modification are not "strong and
reasoned," do not come from substantially affected parties, or come
only from those engaged in "unjustifiable wrongdoing.")
Of course, the Board may act "according to its own best
judgment" in all other matters that do not involve enforcing a
decision against potentially unwilling contracting parties absent
consensus as defined by the contracts and as clarified by this
additional interpretive language.
In contrast, any recommendations made by ICANN's policy
development bodies on matters other than policy as defined above
should have only whatever persuasive merit is inherent in the
recommendation.
C. Process
A bottom-up, consensus-driven approach to policy
development is preferable wherever such approaches do not
prevent the Board from carrying out it's [sic] ultimate
responsibility for ensuring policies are developed,
approved, and implemented as necessary to accomplish
ICANN's mission. That is, wherever practical, the
45. Id. (alterations added).
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development or modification of policies would benefit from
undergoing policy development in the appropriate policy
development body acting with appropriate community
review and input.
New policy development or revisions to existing policies
(collectively called "policy development") may be initiated
by the Board or by the appropriate policy development
body. Any policy development process, particularly when
initiated by the Board, should have most of the following
characteristics:
* A clear assignment to the appropriate policy
development body. If more than one such body has an
appropriate interest, one body shall be assigned the
lead responsibility for coordinating with the others;
" A defined timescale for completing the policy
development leading to a recommendation to the
Board, normally in the range of 60 days or less;
" A predefined process and timescale for collecting and
evaluating community and public input;
" A recommendation to the Board that reflects the inputs
received and corresponding reasons for the presence or
absence of true consensus; the pros and cons of any
recommendation; and summaries of supporters and
opponents;
" An opportunity for the Board to receive advice from
other bodies including Expert Advisory Panels or
bodies... and the GAC;
" A requirement that where practicable the Board
publish a tentative decision that allows for a period of
public comment and review by the assigned policy
development body prior to making a final decision.
These general principles must be adapted by the Board to
different circumstances. Emergency circumstances may be
addressed by implementing temporary policies to be
modified if necessary in follow-up work. The key elements
are that in every situation there be a policy development
plan including a timescale for completion, a process for
receiving public input and other advice, and a process for
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seeking consensus where possible. To the extent feasible
these plans should be developed before initiating the policy
development process.
46
The Blueprint's all-purpose use of the word "policy" should
have been amplified and clarified as part of this implementation
process, so that clear lines would have been drawn between the
various kinds of policies the ICANN Board could create.47
As indicated elsewhere, staff support must be provided to the
policy development groups to ensure they can perform their work in
a timely manner.48
We agree that both the Board and ICANN staff may and should
actively participate in the consensus development process. The
consensus process cannot work without strong leadership, and there
is no requirement that the Board or the staff be neutral about policy
outcomes. Instead, the key requirement for Board and staff
involvement is that they provide adequate opportunities for
participation and accurately report the existence or lack of true
consensus.
None of the above is intended to inhibit the Board from making
policy decisions as appropriate in the absence of the ability of the
community to reach consensus.
49
As noted above, the limited exception to this statement is that
the ability of the Board to enforce policies that direct contracting
parties to do something or not to do something will, of course, turn
on the contractual requirement of documented consensus. Again,
many, if not most, Board actions will not fall into this category.
Ultimately, the Board's legitimacy and effectiveness in
enforcing its policies stem from the fact that parties contracting with
ICANN have voluntarily agreed to abide by future policies under
certain circumstances. No registry or registrar may irrationally, or
for rational reasons based on a desire to continue or commence
activities that harm the competitive marketplace or impose
46. Id.
47. The policies the ICANN Board can adopt are: administrative,
implementation of existing contractual agreements, emergency, and consensus
policies binding on registries and registrars. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
48. See id.
49. See id.
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unjustifiable harms on third parties simply veto the judgment of the
community reflected in a documented consensus process.
As part of the transition process, a task force composed of
representatives from the broad ICANN community should
be established to recommend a specific set of policy
development procedures and timetables. The task force
should complete its work before August 31, 2002, so that its
recommendations can be posted for public comment prior
to ICANN's meeting in Shanghai. °
We believe that the Board should have set specific time frames for
responses by constituencies and Supporting Organization's (SO) to
proposed consensus policies, instead of reserving for itself the ability
to modify these policies or adopting by vote their own "mandatory"
policies. Here is a set of guidelines that would facilitate consensus
policy development:
1. The Board calls for work on a particular consensus policy
(either on its own or when requested to do so). Any refusal or failure
by the Board to respond to a request for a consensus policy should be
subject to review. The Board:
" Indicates its preliminary beliefs about which parties
would be affected by the policy;
" Chooses a SO that will be responsible for the
reviewing report;
* Appoints, with the assistance and oversight of staff,
a facilitator who is personally responsible for
creating the written consensus policy report (and
can be trusted to do an unbiased job);
" Sets a sixty-day deadline for submission of a report
to the relevant SO (all stated deadlines to be
modified only where justified on the basis of
compelling, articulated reasons).
2. The report drafter/facilitator goes to work. The report
drafter:
" Interviews/meets with affected parties;
" Gathers position papers;
* Facilitates consensus to the extent possible;
50. See id.
Spring 2003] 1143
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1127
" Prepares a report documenting policy
recommendation which includes the extent of
agreement among affected groups, the outreach
process used to obtain the views of groups likely to
be affected, and the nature and intensity of reasoned
support and opposition to the proposed policy;
* Sends report to the relevant SO within the time
limit.
3. The SO receives the report. The SO:
* Has thirty days to review the report;
" Council must vote on or before the thirtieth day
whether to recommend that the policy be
established;
* Sends a report, as revised in collaboration with the
facilitator, promptly to the Board, including any
dissenting views.
4. The Board receives the report. The Board:
" Hears presentation from facilitator/drafter;
" Has thirty days to review the report;
" Must vote on or before the thirtieth day whether or
not to establish the policy;
• May override dissent if it is unreasoned or from
unaffected groups.
5. If a dissenter does not agree that consensus was adequately
documented (disputes the presence of a consensus), it may request
IRP review within fifteen days of the decision by the Board.
6. If the IRP sustains the Board's determination that the
specification or policy is based on a consensus among Internet
stakeholders represented in the ICANN process then the dissenter
must implement such specification or policy unless it promptly seeks
and obtains a stay or injunctive relief from a court or arbitrator.
* The report creation should last no more than sixty
days. SO consideration of the report should last an
additional thirty days. Another thirty days would be
devoted to Board consideration, plus fifteen days
where any decision could be appealed. Should there
be an appeal, the IRP should prepare an opinion in
thirty days. In total this process should take no
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more than 165 days (five to six months), not
including court action or arbitration.
Given the effort to be expended by the report drafter/facilitator,
it would be best if, in time, this work were paid for in some neutral
fashion. The Board should be more active in pushing the consensus
policy process along. There are four ways this could be
accomplished:
1. The Board could call for work on a particular consensus
policy;
2. The Board could indicate its preliminary beliefs about which
parties would be affected by the policy;
3. A facilitator could be appointed who would be personally
responsible for creating the written consensus policy report (and
could be trusted to do an unbiased job);
4. Strict deadlines could be set for submission of the report to
the relevant SO.
Leadership on the part of the Board and staff can make an
enormous difference. At a minimum, establishing clear processes
can force those who oppose a proposed policy to clearly articulate
their objections. This articulation requirement is likely by itself to
eliminate a significant amount of unjustifiable opposition. More
generally, the Board and staff can more clearly express their own
views concerning proposed solutions. So long as the ultimate
decision by the Board concerns whether a "true consensus" has been
generated, there is no requirement for Board or staff neutrality about
the outcome.
Such leadership can force dissenting parties to articulate the
reasons why they oppose a proposed policy. And, notably, when
presented with a report that documents widely held support for a
proposed rule, the Board may consider, among other things, whether
the dissenter's opposition to the consensus policy is based solely on a
desire to continue to engage in unjustifiable wrongdoing. The Board
should start by asking:
1. Is the party raising the question substantially impacted?
2. Is its opposition rational or reasoned?
If the answer to either question is "no," the Board may adopt the
policy as supported by consensus despite the dissenter's opposition.
Even if the answers to both of those initial questions are "yes," the
Board may fmd that rational/reasoned opposition of an impacted
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party may be disregarded to the extent that the opposition is based on
a desire to continue or commence an activity that imposes substantial
unjustified burdens on third parties, or that will disrupt or prevent
emergence of an orderly, competitive marketplace.
This "unjustifiable opposition" test is already implicit in the
consensus standard. Many people have erroneously assumed that
any refusal to agree to a new policy could prevent ICANN action.
5 1
To the contrary, just as ICANN can reasonably override dissent from
those who are not affected by its policies and from those who will
not make reasoned arguments, it may, under the current contracts,
reasonably disregard opposition from parties who seek unjustifiably
to impose harm on others.
The existing contracts require the IRP to exist in order for
registries and registrars to be bound by consensus policies. 52 The
arbitration contemplated by the Blueprint should have been
implemented in a fashion that preserved the basic framework for
independent review that is contemplated by the current registry and
registrar contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
We believe the "consensus process" for mandating globally
applicable rules was a basic premise underlying ICANN's
establishment. Because ICANN was not established by the United
States, or any other government, it has no statutory authority.
Additionally, it cannot claim to be a representative democracy.
ICANN has no power to enforce its rules other than by means of its
contracts with registries and registrars. No self-respecting business
would sign up for open-ended policy-making by ICANN's Board of
Directors, given the complete uncertainty such a scheme would pose
to investors. Thus, as has been the case since the earliest days of the
Internet, any mandatory naming policies need to be supported by a
consensus that emerges from bottom-up processes involving all
affected parties.
It is clear to us that ICANN should have been restructured to
work towards consensus more effectively. ICANN's goal should
51. See Working Paper on the Policy-Development Process, supra note 19,
pts. 1, 1(A).
52. See Registrar Accreditation Agreement, supra note 35, § 4.3.6.
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have been to make it possible for stakeholders to decide collectively
when global, mandatory rules are necessary and legitimate. Seizing
more power to make that decision centrally did not serve ICANN's
core mission, as set forth in its Memorandum of Understanding with
the Department of Commerce, of preserving decentralized decision-
making. We fear for ICANN's future in an increasingly litigious
world.
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